"I spent my life delivering grain to the state—building reservoirs and paying agricultural levies—and now I receive 168 yuan a month; meanwhile, a former colleague who retired from the factory next door gets over 3,000 yuan a month and spends his days strolling in the park with his pet bird." These are the words of a 72-year-old farmer from a village in Henan, and they highlight one of the most glaring disparities in the current debate over China's pension system.
Data from 2025 shows that the average monthly basic pension for urban employees nationwide is approximately 3,498 yuan, whereas the 178 million recipients of the urban-rural resident pension receive an average of only about 287 yuan per month—a gap of more than twelvefold. If one compares the pensions of employees in economically developed regions with the basic pensions of elderly people in central and western rural areas (a minimum of 143 yuan/month, rising to 163 yuan in 2026), the disparity exceeds twentyfold. This chasm lies at the heart of the widely debated "dual-track pension system" controversy.
I. Two Systems, Two Lives
my country’s basic pension insurance operates under two separate systems:
Urban Employee Pension Insurance: Funded by joint contributions from employers (16% of the wage base) and individuals (8%). After 15 years of continuous contributions, retirees receive monthly payments drawn from both a pooled fund and their personal accounts, embodying the principle that "paying more and paying longer yields higher benefits."
Urban-Rural Resident Pension Insurance: Primarily covers farmers and unemployed urban residents. Individuals make voluntary annual contributions (most opt for the lowest tier of 200 yuan/year), supplemented by fixed government subsidies. The pension consists of a government-guaranteed basic pension plus a meager amount from the personal account. Because there is no employer contribution and most participants consistently choose the lowest payment tier, personal account balances remain minimal; consequently, 90% of the benefit comes from the government-funded basic pension.
The original rationale provided by the system's designers was that farmers—lacking employers and fixed wages—could not adopt the dual-contribution model used for employees. Instead, an inclusive resident pension scheme featuring "low contributions plus a government safety net" was established to provide a minimum level of security. In reality, however, the resident pension has been locked into a role of "subsistence-level support" rather than "income replacement," creating an inherent disparity compared to the employee pension system.
II. The Core of the Controversy: "Paying More for Less" or "Historical Debt"? Critics (including the general public and many in academia) argue that the disparity has exceeded reasonable limits:
Older farmers (particularly those active between the 1950s and 1970s) made tangible contributions to the state's initial industrialization capital accumulation through mechanisms such as the "price scissors" between industrial and agricultural goods, compulsory labor (e.g., road and reservoir construction), and the state monopoly on purchase and marketing; yet, they were excluded from the employee social security system, meaning their historical contributions lacked institutional recognition.
The basic pension for urban and rural residents started at 55 yuan per person per month in 2009 and rose to only 163 yuan over the following decade-plus; the rate of increase has lagged far behind adjustments to employee pensions and the rise in price levels, causing the relative gap to widen continuously.
For rural elderly individuals, a monthly income of 200–300 yuan is insufficient to cover basic living expenses (staple foods, cooking oil, vegetables, and medical costs), forcing them to continue working in the fields or rely on their children—a situation that falls short of the goal of ensuring the elderly are well-supported in their later years.
Some experts in the social security field argue against attributing the issue to emotional factors:
The high benefit levels of employee pensions are underpinned by hundreds of thousands of yuan in actual accumulated contributions from both individuals and their employers; simply calling for "equal payouts" while ignoring differences in funding sources would undermine the incentive structure of the insurance system.
The real problem lies in the excessively low absolute level of the basic pension for residents and the lack of an adjustment mechanism, rather than in employee pensions being too high; the solution is to "raise the floor" rather than "cap the ceiling."
Basic pensions in cities like Shanghai and Beijing have already surpassed 1,300 yuan, demonstrating that the disparity stems primarily from differences in local fiscal capacity and an overly low national minimum standard, rather than from any inherent, irreconcilable flaw in the system itself.
III. Policy Trends and Social Consensus
Recent controversies have driven substantive adjustments:
Incremental increases: The national minimum standard for the basic pension for urban and rural residents is set to rise to 123 yuan in 2024 and 143 yuan in 2025, with a further 20-yuan increase to 163 yuan in 2026, marking a shift toward a pattern of "annual incremental adjustments." Calls from the "Two Sessions": Deputies to the National People's Congress have repeatedly proposed raising the basic pension for farmers aged 70 and older to 400–500 yuan per month. Meanwhile, scholars have suggested raising the per capita rural pension to an annual income of 10,000 yuan (approximately 833 yuan per month) during the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, alongside establishing a mechanism for regular increases linked to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and resident income.
Differentiated Treatment: The mainstream academic view advocates for prioritizing substantial benefit increases for elderly farmers who have retired from the workforce (aged 70 or 80+) as a form of historical compensation. For younger and middle-aged farmers, the strategy involves incentivizing higher contributions through increased payment subsidies and collective allowances, thereby gradually strengthening the system's "insurance" nature.
IV. Conclusion
The gap between urban and rural pensions is, in essence, the ultimate reflection of China's urban-rural dual structure within the realm of social security. It is not a matter of anyone being "biased"; however, whether we allow this divide to widen further tests a society's commitment to fairness.
One thing is certain: the high pension benefits enjoyed by urban employees should not be cut. Equally certain is that elderly farmers—who have spent their lives growing and delivering grain—should not have to rely on a mere token payment of just over a hundred yuan a month in their twilight years. A genuine solution requires the basic pension to truly fulfill its purpose of "guaranteeing the basics"—meaning it should be no lower than the rural subsistence allowance standard—so that farmers, too, can age with dignity.
After all, a nation's level of civilization should not be measured solely by the enthusiasm with which urban retirees dance in public squares; it must also be judged by whether the few banknotes clutched in the hands of a seventy-year-old farmer—still toiling in the fields—are enough to buy a single hot meal.
